Ukraine  and  Russia 


A  Survey  of  Their  Economic 
Relations 


By  WOLDEMAR  ^TIMOSHENKO 

Vice  Director  of  the  Economic  Institute  at  the  Academy 
of  Sciences  of  Ukraine 


1919 

PUBLISHED  BY 

FRIENDS  OF  UKRAINE 

345  MUNSEY  BUILDING 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


OTHER  PAMPHLETS  PUBLISHED 
BY 

THE  FRIENDS  OF  UKRAINE 


1 .  Ukraine,  Poland  and  Russia  and  the  Right  of  the 

Free  Disposition  of  Peoples.      By  S.  Shelukhin. 
Ten  cents. 

2.  Protest  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic  to  the  United 

States  Against  the  Delivery  of  Eastern  Galicia 
to  Polish  Domination.     Ten  cents. 

3.  The   Jewish    Pogroms    in    Ukraine.      By   Julian 

Batchinsky,  Israel  Zangwill  and  others.     Fifteen 
cents. 


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Ukraine  and  Russia 

A  Survey  of  Their  Economic  Relations 

It  has  long  been  contended  that  the  Ukraine  could  not 
exist  as  a  separate  state.  It  is  said  her  economic  interests 
are  so  largely  dependent  upon  those  of  the  old  Russian 
Empire  that  if  separated  therefrom,  she  would  lack  the 
economic  strength  to  form  a  viable  entity,  and  thus  would 
render  herself  liable  to  decline  or  gradual  absorption  by 
some  other  state.  In  the  light  of  present  facts,  both  econo- 
mists and  impartial  statesmen  will  find  that  this  argument, 
which,  among  members  of  the  opposing  faction,  seems  to 
form  the  primary  basis  for  objection  to  Ukraine's  inde- 
pendent statehood,  will  not  bear  even  the  most  superficial 
investigation. 

Ukraine's  Richness  in  Natural  Resources 

The  Ukraine  is  a  country  with  nearly  50,000,000  inhabi- 
tants, and  possesses  within  its  limits  the  most  fertile  lands 
of  Europe,  which,  every  year,  feed  the  western  countries 
from  their  enormous  surplus  of  cereals,  of  cattle  and  of 
sugar.  It  is  a  country  which  stands  fifth  in  the  world  in  its 
production  of  coal  and  iron;  which  has  at  its  disposal 
quantities  of  other  raw  materials,  such  as  naphtha,  mag- 
nesia, salt  and  mercury;  which  has,  moreover,  several  hun- 
dred kilometers  of  water  front.  If,  with  all  these  natural 
advantages  and  wealth,  the  Ukraine  cannot  enjoy  an  auton- 
omous life,  how,  then,  can  one  explain  the  existence  of 
Italy,  Spain,  Roumania  and  many  other  European  coun- 
tries in  which  the  natural  conditions  are  far  less  favorable 
to  economic  independence? 

These  facts  have  gradually  become  so  self-evident  to  the 
public  mind  that  oppositionists  are  being  forced  to  abandon 
their  former  line  of  argument,  and  are  now  beginning  to 
attack  the  question  from  the  reverse  standpoint.  They  now 
claim,  not  that  Ukraine  cannot  form  and  maintain  her 
economic  unity,  but  that  Russia  cannot  live  without 
Ukraine,  and  that,  without  Ukraine,  Russia  would  lack 


elements  which  are  absolutely  essential  to  her  economic 
existence.  In  this  new  phase  of  reasoning,  it  is  evident 
that  other  interests  than  those  of  the  Ukraine  intervene, 
and  one  can  easily  detect  the  Russian  point  of  view.  How- 
ever, in  our  present  study  of  the  subject,  let  us  lay  aside 
all  thought  of  any  ulterior  motive  on  the  part  of  our  ad- 
versaries, and  approach  the  matter  in  an  objective  manner, 
in  order  to  discern,  if  possible,  the  vital  economic  interests 
of  the  Russian  people  which  might  suffer  through  the 
creation  of  an  independent  Ukraine. 

Is  Great  Russia  Economically  Dependent  on  Ukraine? 

Concisely  stated,  the  three  fundamental  bases  of  opposi- 
tion usually  put  forward  are: 

1.  The.  Ukraine   is   the  granary   of   Russia.      Without 
Ukraine,  upon  which  she  depended  for  her  entire  supply  of 
agricultural  products,  Russia  would  suffer  from  hunger. 

2.  The  Ukraine  separates  Russia   from  the  Black  Sea 
and  the  Sea  of  Azov,  thus  closing  the  door  to   foreign 
markets. 

3.  If  the  Ukraine  were  established  in  ethnographic  lim- 
its, she  would  thus  possess  nearly  all  the  coal  and  iron  of 
the  old  Russian  Empire,  and  hence  would  cut  off  Russia's 
present   supply   of  these   indispensable   raw   materials   of 
industry. 

Let  us  candidly  and  thoroughly  examine  each  of  these 
arguments. 

In  the  first  place,  statistics  show  that  Ukraine  has  always 
been  the  granary  for  western  Europe  rather  than  for 
Russia  and  has,  in  fact,  exported  only  a  very  small  per 
cent  of  her  cereal  products  into  Russia.  The  latter,  fur- 
thermore, possessed  such  an  excess  of  grain  that  she  herself 
has  exported  in  the  past,  and  still  continues  to  export,  an 
appreciable  quantity  of  cereals. 

Great  Russia's  Own  Grain  Supply  Ample 

For  the  years  1909-1911,  during  which  time  the  exports 
were  especially  large,  the  total  quantity  of  cereals  shipped 
from  former  Russia  averaged  440,000,000  bushels  each 
year.  Of  this  amount  the  nine  Ukrainian  governments 

4 


supplied  201,670,000.  If  we  now  add  to  these  nine  gov- 
ernments the  Kuban,  the  Ukrainian  region  north  of  the 
Caucasus,  as  well  as  the  Ukrainian  parts  of  other  govern- 
ments which  border  them,  we  must  increase  these  figures 
by  91,670,000,  which  gives  to  ethnographic  Ukraine  an 
exportation  of  about  293,340,000  bushels  of  cereals.  Dur- 
ing this  time  the  other  parts  of  former  Russia,  including 
Siberia,  exported  about  40,000,000  bushels  annually.  As 
neither  Poland  nor  Finland  exported  cereals,  and  Lithuania 
and  the  Baltic  provinces  only  small  quantities,  if  any,  it  was 
Russia  proper  that  had  the  large  excess. 

As  to  the  Ukraine,  her  exportations  of  cereals  to  Russia 
did  not  reach  more  than  10  to  15  per  cent  of  her  total 
output;  that  is  to  say,  about  six  or  seven  million  bushels, 
and  nearly  all  of  that  was  destined  for  Poland,  Lithuania 
and  White  Russia,  Great  Russia  consuming  only  a  small 
fraction  of  the  amount.  Then,  too,  the  Ukrainian  wheat 
has  always  had  as  a  competitor  in  the  markets  of  Moscow 
and  Petrograd  the  wheat  from  the  fields  of  Siberia  and  the 
regions  of  the  Volga. 

If  hunger  now  exists  in  Russia,  it  is  due  to  a  dreadful 
crisis  in  transportation,  to  which  may  be  added  the  fact 
that  Siberia  and  some  parts  of  the  Volga  regions  refuse 
their  wheat  to  Russia  in  the  present  Bolshevist  state  and, 
even  within  Bolshevist  Russia,  the  peasants  will  not  give 
their  wheat  to  the  cities,  since  they  get  nothing  from  the 
cities  in  return.  In  the  Petrograd  and  Moscow  districts, 
suffering  has  been  heightened  by  the  Allied  blockade. 

In  this  way,  a  fair  analysis  of  existing  agricultural  con- 
ditions with  reference  to  relative  production  and  exporta- 
tion in  both  Ukraine  and  Russia  proves  the  fallacy  of  the 
first  argument  advanced  by  those  who  interpose  these  con- 
ditions as  a  barrier  to  Ukraine's  economic  freedom.  The 
irrefutable  fact  remains  that,  instead  of  depending  upon 
the  Ukraine  for  wheat,  Russia  not  only  has  enough  for 
her  own  use  but,  even  during  those  years  when  the  harvests 
in  the  east  of  Russia  and  in  Siberia  fail  to  reach  their 
maximum,  retains  a  sufficient  surplus  of  grain  to  enable 
her  to  export  it  in  considerable  quantities. 

The   second  objection,   which   involves   the  question   of 


Russia's  need  for  the  Ukrainian  ports  of  the  Black  Sea  and 
the  Sea  of  Azov,  is  readily  refuted  by  Russian  maritime 
history. 

Great  Russia  Not  Dependent  on  the  Black  Sea  Ports 

We  grant  that,  to  the  casual  thinker  with  little  or  no 
knowledge  of  the  trade  routes  of  modern  commerce,  it 
may  at  first  appear  that  Russia  cannot  live  without  south- 
ern ports,  but,  while  it  is  true  that  more  than  half  of  the 
maritime  exports  of  former  Russia  were  on  the  Black  Sea 
and  the  Sea  of  Azov,  those  who  present  this  argument 
forget  that  the  Ukrainian  exports  composed  nearly  half 
of  those  of  the  whole  Russian  Empire.  It  has  already 
been  proved  that  ethnic  Ukraine  shipped  about  two-thirds 
of  the  total  amount  of  cereals.  If  we  take  these  facts  into 
consideration,  we  must  conclude  that  it  was  the  Ukraine 
which  used  the  southern  ports  and  not  Russia.  Nor  did 
Russia  export  much  of  her  merchandise  by  way  of  the 
Black  Sea.  The  official  Russian  statistics  of  the  traffic  of 
merchandise  by  rail  show  no  southern  port  except  Rostov- 
on-the-Don,  which  served  as  an  outlet  for  the  products  of 
the  territories  situated  north  of  the  ethnic  frontier  of  the 
Ukraine  and  Russia.  As  to  Novorosseysk,  that  was  al- 
ways the  port  for  the  Cossacks  of  Kuban  and  of  the  north- 
ern Caucasus.  Even  the  northern  regions  of  the  Ukraine, 
including  the  governments  of  Tchernihov,  that  of  Poltava 
and  a  part  of  the  government  of  Kharkov,  sent  their  wheat 
by  the  ports  of  the  Baltic  and  even  by  Libau  and  Koenigs- 
berg. 

Statistics  indicate  that  imports  have  never  been  shipped 
in  by  way  of  the  Black  Sea  to  any  great  extent.  The 
records  of  Russian  foreign  commerce  for  the  year  1912 
show  that  80  per  cent  of  the  maritime  imports  of  the  old 
empire  of  Russia  were  made  by  way  of  the  Baltic,  so  that 
even  the  Ukraine  received  much  foreign  merchandise  by 
this  route.  The  policy  of  the  Russian  Government  was 
always  in  favor  of  Baltic  ports,  to  the  detriment  of  those 
on  the  Black  Sea.  Finally  speaking,  all  Russian  commer- 
cial policy,  in  which  an  important  item  was  the  railroad 
rates,  was  in  favor  of  the  Baltic  ports. 


Let  us  compare  for  a  moment  the  regions  for  which  the 
Black  and  the  Baltic  Seas  serve  as  ports.  That  for  which 
the  Black  Sea  affords  an  outlet  does  not  extend  more  than 
500  or  600  kilometers,  while  that  served  by  the  Baltic 
ports  reaches  as  far  as  western  Siberia.  Thus,  the  Baltic 
region  exceeds  that  of  the  Black  Sea  by  several  thousand 
kilometers. 

Surely  these  facts,  coupled  with  even  the  most  cursory 
consideration  of  the  Russian  imperialistic  policy,  show  be- 
yond a  doubt  that  in  respect  to  the  direct  economic  utiliza- 
tion of  the  southern  ports,  the  setting  up  of  a  separate 
government  by  the  Ukraine  does  not  obstruct  any  funda- 
mental interests  of  the  Russian  people.  Briefly  stated, 
Russia  proper  does  not  use  directly  the  southern  ports 
except  Rostov,  which  is  the  outlet  of  the  region  of  the  Don 
and  in  part  of  the  lower  region  of  the  Volga,  but  there  is 
not  such  a  vast  difference  between  the  Russian  and  Ukrain- 
ian interests  that  these  minor  details  as  to  a  common  use  of 
various  ports  can  not  be  conciliated  by  special  agreement. 

Coal  Fields  of  Ukraine  Not  Necessary  to 
Great  Russia 

Proceeding  directly  to  the  third  and  last  question,  that 
involving  coal  and  iron,  we  are  confronted  first  of  all 
with  the  geographic  fact  that  it  is  really  within  the  ethno- 
graphic limits  of  the  Ukraine  that  are  found  nearly  all  the 
coal  fields  of  Donetz,  as  well  as  most  of  the  productive  cen- 
ters of  anthracite.  More  than  90  per  cent  of  the  total  out- 
put of  coal  of  the  Donetz  basin,  during  the  last  years  of 
normal  exploitation,  came  from  the  Ukrainian  regions, 
while  the  total  production  of  coal  of  the  Donetz  basin 
reached  70  per  cent  of  the  general  production  of  coal  of  the 
old  Russian  Empire,  and  we  may  increase  this  to  85  per 
cent,  if  we  do  not  include  in  the  total  the  output  of  Russian 
Poland.  Notwithstanding  these  percentages  of  production, 
the  general  statistics  of  railroad  traffic,  together  with  the 
data  collected  by  the  Special  War  Committee  on  the  Supply 
of  Fuel,  show  that  nearly  four-fifths  of  the  Ukrainian  coal 
and  anthracite  was  used  in  Ukraine,  one-fifth  only  being 
exported  to  Russia. 

7 


The  Ukraine  has  almost  no  fuel  except  the  coal  from 
Donetz.  Northern  and  Central  Russia,  on  the  contrary, 
have  wood,  peat  and  coal  from  the  south  of  Moscow. 
Northwestern  Russia  and  the  Baltic  provinces  never  used 
the  coal  from  Donetz,  as  it  could  not  compete  in  price 
with  the  English  or  German  coal.  During  the  war,  doubt- 
less because  the  Baltic  Sea  was  closed,  they  began  to  trans- 
port coal  from  Donetz  to  Petrograd.  Now  the  Baltic  Sea 
is  reopened  and  its  freedom  guaranteed  by  the  Allies. 
Therefore,  English  coal  can  regain  its  natural  markets. 

The  industrial  region  of  Moscow,  as  well  as  that  of  the 
Volga,  received  an  enormous  quantity  of  naphtha  from 
Baku  which  competes  as  fuel  with  the  coal  of  Donetz. 
When  the  conditions  have  again  become  normal,  exports 
of  naphtha  will  recommence,  because  the  basin  of  the 
Volga  is  the  natural  outlet  for  the  oil  fields  of  Baku.  The 
Urals  and  Siberia  are  supplied  with  local  coal,  while  in 
western  Siberia  are  found  vast  deposits,  in  the  region  of 
Kutznetsk.  These  beds  are  more  extended  and  richer  than 
those  of  Donetz,  but  the  coal  fields  were  scarcely  worked 
because  the  means  of  transportation  was  very  primitive. 
They  can  be  joined  to  the  Ural  and  Altai  regions  either  by 
rail  or  water.  Under  these  conditions  the  inexhaustible 
ore  supplies  of  the  Urals  and  the  Altai  district  will  supply 
the  metal  industry  of  Russia  in  such  quantities  that  Russia 
will  become  metallurgically  independent  of  the  Ukraine. 
Thus  the  coal  fields  of  Donetz,  which  have  always  been 
more  Ukrainian  than  Russian,  should  in  the  future  re- 
main entirely  Ukrainian. 

Furthermore,  the  question  of  the  basin  of  Donetz  is  not 
concluded.  The  ethnographic  frontier  of  the  Ukraine  and 
of  Russia  passes  through  these  coal  fields.  The  Ukraine 
and  Russia  could  easily,  for  their  mutual  interests,  reach 
some  understanding  and  modify  this  frontier.  But  in  any 
event  the  most  important  part  of  the  coal  field  should  re- 
main in  the  Ukrainian  limits,  because  the  facts  up  to  date 
show  how  much  more  Donetz  is  bound  to  the  Ukrainian 
industry  than  to  that  of  Russia.  The  metallurgical  indus- 
try alone  of  the  Ukraine  consumes  nearly  30  per  cent  of 
the  total  production  of  the  basin. 

8 


Ukraine's  Iron  Supply  Not  Essential  to 
Great  Russia 

We  now  come  to  the  question  of  iron.  Here  also  it  is 
claimed  that  the  economic  development  of  Russia  is  impos- 
sible without  the  Ukrainian  iron.  But  we  can  answer 
without  the  slightest  hesitation  that  this  affirmation  is 
incorrect. 

It  is  a  fact  that  the  Ukraine  produced  two-thirds  or 
three-fourths  of  the  iron  of  former  Russia.  She  exported 
a  considerable  quantity  into  the  old  empire,  but  one  cannot 
conclude  that  this  situation  will  not  change  in  the  future. 
True,  the  development  of  the  metallurgical  industry  in  the 
Ukraine  in  the  last  forty  years  was  much  greater  than  in 
the  Urals  and  the  other  provinces.  But  if  we  wish  to  draw 
more  specific  conclusions,  we  must  remember  that  the  beds 
of  iron  ore  in  the  Ukraine  are  not  very  large.  Those  in 
the  region  of  Krivy  Rih  in  the  Kherson  government  near 
that  of  Ekaterinoslav,  which  are  now  the  principal  source 
of  the  iron  ore  in  the  Ukraine,  may  exhaust  themselves  in 
a  few  decades  as  will  the  scarcely  more  abundant  ore  fields 
of  Crimea. 

It  would  be  erroneous  to  assume  that  the  metal  produc- 
tion of  the  Ukraine  would  be  adequate  to  the  needs  of  all 
Russia  for  any  great  period  of  time.  Knowing  the  proba- 
bilities of  early  exhaustion  of  the  limited  beds  of  Ukrain- 
ian ore,  and  in  intelligent  observance  of  the  laws  of  con- 
servation, Russia  must,  with  that  wisdom  and  foresight 
which  has  made  for  industrial  soundness  in  all  strong  na- 
tions, increase  her  production  of  iron  in  the  Urals  and  in 
Siberia.  For  the  time  being,  however,  and  until  Russia 
can  bring  into  operation  the  products  of  her  hitherto  un- 
developed areas,  the  Ukraine  can  and  desires  to  maintain 
her  place  on  the  Russian  markets  with  metals,  as  with 
sugar. 

Economic  Co-operation  is  Possible 

It  is  the  earnest  desire  of  the  Ukraine  that  her  future 
economic  relations  with  Russia  be  intensely  co-operative 
and  that  the  commercial  relations  of  the  two  states  under 

9 


the  sane  regulation  of  special  treaties  become  closer  and 
more  sound  as  time  progresses,  after  the  manner  of  those 
in  all  other  independent  countries.  The  essentials  in  the 
case  are  two- fold :  On  the  one  hand,  the  constitution  of  the 
independent  Ukrainian  State  must  not  violate  the  vital  in- 
terests of  great  Russia;  on  the  other  hand,  the  wish  of  the 
Ukrainian  people  to  be  self-governing  and  therefore  to 
create  an  independent  national  state  wherein  they  can  en- 
joy the  blessings  of  "life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness" must  be  given  just  consideration,  and  there  must  be 
no  unreasonable  violation  of  the  sacred  principles  involved. 
Nor  should  the  people's  inalienable  rights  be  subordinated 
in  any  degree  to  mere  commercial,  political  or  any  selfish 
or  less  worthy  interests,  which  though  advantageous  to  one 
nation,  work  irreparable  wrong  to  another.  Mutuality  of 
interests  must  be  the  ruling  motive  in  all  such  dealings  be- 
tween the  nations. 

Let  us  go  deeper  into  our  subject  and  discuss  now  the 
economic  advantages  enjoyed  by  the  Ukraine  when  she 
formed  an  integral  part  of  the  Russian  Empire;  let  us  dis- 
cover, if  possible,  what  has  been  the  economic  policy  of 
the  empire  for  the  last  forty  years.  The  fundamental 
directing  idea  of  this  policy  was  industrial  protection,  and 
we  can  interpose  no  objection  to  such  a  general  idea,  for  is 
it  not  incumbent  upon  any  state  that  is  seeking  the  highest 
in  economic  development  to  protect  its  national  industries? 
But  now  we  come  to  the  vital  issue  of  the  operation  of 
this  policy  of  industrial  protection  as  exercised  by  Russia 
in  her  relations  with  the  Ukraine.  Here  we  shall  see,  as 
has  often  been  the  case,  that  the  theory  of  a  policy  and 
its  realization  were  two  different  things. 

Customs  System  of  Old  Russian  Empire 

The  old  Russian  Empire,  with  its  immense  territory, 
exceeds  that  of  all  other  European  countries  combined, 
provided  we  exclude  from  our  comparison  all  colonial 
possessions.  It  presents  itself  to  us  as  a  striking  example 
of  a  conglomeration  of  different  countries  and  peoples  who 
differed  greatly  in  the  organization  of  their  economic  life, 
as  well  as  in  the  degree  of  their  culture.  Indeed,  several 

10 


of  its  governments  were  nothing  but  colonies,  differing 
from  such  only  in  that  colonies,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term,  are  geographically  separated  from  the  mother  coun- 
try. Notwithstanding  this  natural  condition,  Russia  adopt- 
ed the  economic  policies  of  the  other  continental  European 
countries,  which  were  much  more  compact  and  decidedly 
more  homogeneous  than  herself,  and  whose  colonies,  being 
outside  the  custom  frontiers  of  their  respective  mother 
countries,  enjoyed  a  separate  customs  regulation  adapted 
to  the  facilities  and  conditions  of  their  separate  locations. 
Contrary  to  this  seemingly  universal  European  colonial 
regulation,  Russia  made  all  her  colonies  enter  into  a  com- 
mon frontier  as  to  customs,  and  applied  to  them  a  general 
customs  tariff,  which  gives  her  commercial  policy  a  peculiar 
characteristic. 

Immense  Russia,  whose  provinces  were  so  unlike,  had 
an  abundance  of  natural  resources  for  developing  and 
satisfying  the  many  diversified  interests  of  her  entire  ag- 
gregation of  possessions.  Yet  her  customs  tariff  was 
strictly  uniform  in  its  application  to  her  whole  territory, 
inclusive  even  of  remote  Vladivostok.  Every  possible  in- 
dustry was  protected,  and  in  Petrograd  and  Moscow,  for 
example,  every  branch  of  every  legitimate  industry  was 
under  the  strictest  surveillance  as  to  customs  tariff.  As 
a  consequence,  all  Russia  paid  a  high  tax  for  every  factory 
in  the  land,  whether  it  was  near  to  or  far  removed  from 
the  territory  thus  unjustly  encumbered  with  taxes  to  sup- 
port industries  from  which  it  derived  not  even  the  most 
meager  benefit.  Furthermore,  there  was  a  uniform  tariff 
for  customs,  so  that  one  form  of  protection  operated  to  the 
detriment  of  the  other,  and  in  particular  caused  a  gradual 
annihilation  of  the  growth  of  agricultural  industry  in  the 
provinces.  The  result  is  easily  foreseen :  Such  a  rigid  and 
uniform  commercial  policy  proved  absolutely  impracticable 
in  a  country  as  non-homogeneous  as  was  Russia. 

Agriculture  proved  to  be  the  most  seriously  affected  of 
all  the  industries,  not  only  because  the  agricultural  peoples 
under  this  system  were  forced  to  pay  nearly  double  prices 
for  industrial  products,  but  also  because  Russia  at  this 
time  engaged  in  a  customs  war  with  western  Europe.  In 

11 


an  effort  to  lower  the  tax  on  manufactured  articles,  the 
European  countries  began  to  put  exorbitant  duties  on  Rus- 
sian agricultural  products.  Subsequent  records  show  how 
detrimental  was  the  Russo-German  treaty  of  1904  to  agri- 
culture among  the  Russian  peoples.  Thus  were  the  in- 
terests of  the  agricultural  regions  clearly  sacrificed  to  the 
interests  of  a  few  industrial  centers. 

Policy  of  Former  Russia  Injurious  to  Ukraine 

How  did  this  affect  the  Ukraine?  We  have  shown  that, 
in  former  Russia,  the  Ukraine  was  the  principal  exporter 
of  agricultural  products,  and  that  she  could  not  find  a 
market  for  her  wheat  in  industrial  Russia  because  of  the 
stern  competition  offered  by  the  Volga  and  Siberia.  Hence 
her  only  course  was  to  seek  an  outside  market,  and  this  she 
did  by  exporting  all  surplus  cereals  to  western  Europe. 
Even  here  Russia  subordinated  the  Ukrainian  agricultural 
interests  to  the  interests  of  industrial  security.  Added  to 
this  injustice,  she  took  no  steps  to  encourage  Ukrainian 
exportation  into  central  Russia.  Money  was  spent  in  con- 
structing elevators  in  the  region  of  the  Volga  and  in 
Siberia  and  refrigerator  trains  were  organized  for  ship- 
ping meat,  poultry,  butter  and  fruit  into  eastern  Russia, 
Siberia  and  Central  Asia :  all  this  to  the  neglect  of  Ukrain- 
ian interests.  Nor  was  there  any  compensation  for  this 
loss  by  the  promotion  of  the  manufacturing  industry  in 
Ukraine.  It  is  an  indisputable  fact  that  Ukrainian  manu- 
factures are  much  less  developed  than  those  of  either 
Russia  or  Russian  Poland.  We  can  find  one  reason  for 
this,  however,  in  a  certain  period  of  Ukraine's  history. 

Russia  and  Poland  were  already  enjoying  an  assured  and 
peaceful  national  life  while  Ukraine  was  still  struggling 
against  the  factors  which  were  devastating  her  territory. 
The  colonization  of  certain  Ukrainian  territories  after  the 
expulsion  of  the  nomads  took  place  much  later  than  that 
of  the  other  Russian  provinces.  Later,  Ukraine  was  in- 
vaded by  the  Poles,  who  did  not  cease  to  treat  her  like  a 
colony,  and  exploited  her  entirely  for  their  own  benefit. 
Hence,  at  the  time  of  Ukraine's  incorporation  into  Russia, 

12 


the  latter  had  industries,  while  Ukraine  had  none.  To  add 
to  the  difficulties  already  surrounding  her  industrial  initia- 
tive and  development,  Ukraine,  being  included  in  the  same 
customs  frontier  with  Moscow  and  Warsaw,  was ,  forced 
from  the  very  first  to  compete  with  districts  industrially 
much  stronger  than  herself.  Thus,  while  Ukraine  re- 
mained a  colony  of  Russia,  her  growth  was  thwarted  and 
checked  rather  than  fostered  by  the  mother  country  and 
was  in  danger  of  the  same  fate  that  overtook  Ukrainian 
Galicia,  which  was  smothered  in  the  custom  frontiers  of 
Austria,  and  remained  a  colony  for  the  industries  of  Ger- 
man Austria. 

We  cannot  stop  with  a  consideration  of  commercial  pol- 
icies alone  in  seeking  to  discover  the  Russian  agencies  that 
were  unfavorable  to  the  economic  interests  of  Ukraine, 
for  there  are  many  other  matters  to  be  studied,  if  one  is  to 
give  a  clear  and  unbiased  perspective  of  the  true  situation. 

Over-centralization  in  Former  Russia 

Results  show  that  the  guiding  principle  of  all  Russian 
policy  was  centralization,  absolute  and  unqualified.  Even 
the  most  insignificant  orders  of  the  State,  which  were  to 
be  carried  out  thousands  of  miles  away  from  the  center  of 
the  empire,  could  not  be  passed  except  by  the  agreement 
of  the  central  government  in  Petrograd,  which,  from  the 
very  nature  of  affairs,  understood  little  of  the  needs  and 
condition  of  the  people  upon  whom  they  were  to  be  inflicted. 
Naturally,  the  only  beneficiaries  were  the  manufacturers, 
contractors  or  intermediaries  who  were  in  favor  at  court 
and  near  the  antechambers  of  the  ministries,  while  the 
interests  having  no  headquarters  at  Petrograd  stood  little 
chance  of  securing  any  orders  from  the  State.  Because  of 
these  conditions,  the  administration  of  all  the  important 
enterprises — factories,  banks,  insurance  companies  and 
similar  organizations — was  located  in  Moscow  or  Petrograd. 
Even  mills  and  factories  were  often  located  in  inconvenient 
points,  simply  because  they  were  nearer  the  center  of 
things.  The  higher  branches  of  technical  education  were 
likewise  centralized  there. 

13 


During  the  last  thirty  or  forty  years,  it  is  true,  the 
economic  situation  of  the  Ukraine  has  changed  consider- 
ably; three  large  industries  have  developed  in  the  country: 
the  sugar  industry,  the  mining  and  the  metal  industries. 
And  one  is  tempted  to  say  that  this  development  was  due 
to  Russian  protection.  But  is  this  quite  correct?  Un- 
doubtedly the  protection  had  some  influence,  but  not  as 
much  as  one  might  suppose.  In  the  first  place,  one  must 
not  forget  that  in  the  Ukraine  there  are  natural  conditions 
much  more  favorable  to  these  industries  than  in  any  other 
part  of  the  Russian  Empire.  Certainly  the  sugar,  metal 
and  mining  interests  are  among  those  which  depend  on 
the  location  of  their  raw  materials  and  can  never  start  in  a 
place  where  these  are  lacking.  Besides,  these  industries 
are  infinitely  more  fostered  by  transportational  advantages 
than  by  custom  duties.  The  duties  which  were  imposed 
on  foreign  coal  did  not  prevent  the  importation  of  English 
coal  into  the  Baltic  provinces  nor  into  Petrograd.  On  the 
other  hand,  even  if  all  custom  duties  on  foreign  coal  had 
been  suppressed,  it  would  never  have  penetrated  into  cen- 
tral Russia  and  there  replaced  the  fuel  of  Donetz.  As  to 
the  sugar,  the  situation  in  the  Ukraine  was  perhaps  even 
more  favorable.  As  to  metallurgy,  it  no  doubt  profited  by 
the  protective  Russian  tax.  But  there  again  the  role  of 
this  tax  was  not  very  great.  In  fact,  the  products  of 
Ukrainian  metallurgy  were  heavy  (rails,  beams,  tires, 
wheels,  pipes,  iron  bars,  etc.),  and  their  manufacture  was 
only  slightly  stimulated  by  the  tax  because  of  the  great  dis- 
tances over  which  they  had,  in  any  case,  to  be  carried.  Pro- 
tective tariff  is  much  more  necessary  to  those  industries 
which  supply  finished  products  of  light  weight,  but  of  these 
the  Ukraine  furnished  very  few.  The  textile  industry  of 
Moscow  and  of  .Poland  profited  much  more  by  protection, 
as  did  many  other  branches  of  the  industrial  activities  of 
central  Russia. 

Effect  of  Russian  Imperial  Methods  in  Ukraine 

Therefore,  by  this  system,  the  Ukraine  had  more  loss 
than  profit.  She  was  still  a  market  for  Russian  and  Polish 
industrial  products,  for  which  she  paid  high  prices.  But 

14 


for  her  own  industry  the  Russian  custom  frontier  gave  her 
insufficient  protection;  on  the  contrary,  it  rather  reserved 
the  Ukrainian  market  to  Moscow  and  Warsaw. 

Consequently  the  industrial  development  of  the  Ukraine 
was  very  slow.  The  agricultural  population  did  not  find 
enough  work  in  the  towns,  ahd,  as  a  result,  the  surplus  of 
agrarian  population  increased  every  year.  In  some  parts 
of  the  Ukraine  this  surplus  population  was  more  serious 
than  in  any  other  part  of  former  Russia.  In  the  central 
Ukrainian  provinces  the  agrarian  population  reached  800  to 
1,000  inhabitants  per  1,000  hektares  of  arable  land,  while 
in  France  and  Germany  the  average  was  about  500  inhab- 
itants. There  was  nothing  left  for  the  Ukrainian  popula- 
tion but  to  emigrate  and  colonize  the  lands  of  Siberia  and 
of  Central  Asia.  There  was  also  a  rather  considerable 
movement  of  emigration  towards  America.  The  most  fer- 
tile governments  of  the  Ukraine  furnished  many  more 
emigrants  than  the  less  fertile  but  more  industrial  regions 
of  central  Russia. 

Emigration  as  a  Possible  Solution 

As  a  consolation,  it  is  pointed  out  that,  in  case  of  the 
reunion  of  the  Ukraine  with  Russia,  the  Ukraine  will  have 
in  Siberia  a  field  for  emigration  all  ready.  But  that  is  very 
poor  consolation.  Can  emigration  satisfy  any  country? 
Are  the  Italians  proud  of  sending  many  emigrants  to 
America?  Did  the  Germans  have  cause  to  feel  flattered  by 
increasing  the  trans- Atlantic  emigration,  before  they  de- 
veloped their  own  industries? 

Why,  then,  should  it  be  the  lot  of  the  Ukraine  to  let 
her  population  emigrate  to  distant  Siberia? 

Why  can  she  not  develop  her  economic  life  in  such  a 
manner  that  all  her  people  shall  have  work  on  their  own 
soil?  The  Ukraine  ought  not  to  remain  an  outlet  for  the 
industrial  work  of  the  Russians  and  Poles  when  her  own 
people  cannot  find  any  work  at  home. 

But  one  might  ask  why  no  complaint  has  been  heard  up 
to  the  present,  either  from  the  Ukrainians  engaged  in  in- 
dustry or  from  those  engaged  in  agriculture?  Why  did 

15 


they  not  protest  against  a  policy  which  was  almost  fatal 
to  them?  At  first,  it  is  true,  complaints  were  sometimes 
made,  and  if  they  have  not  been  more  frequent,  it  is  be- 
cause in  the  old  Russian  Empire  there  was  no  tribunal 
where  they  might  be  heard.  Political  economy  in  Russia 
was  centralized  in  the  ministry.  It  was  never  the  subject 
of  any  public  discussion.  Hereafter  she  should  face  the 
political  stage  where  the  voice  of  the  Ukrainian  people 
can  make  itself  heard. 

However,  the  policies  of  the  present  directors  of  the  res- 
urrection of  the  Russian  Empire  seem  to  tend,  like  those 
of  their  predecessors,  toward  preventing  the  Ukrainian 
people  from  manifesting  their  will,  disposing  freely  of 
their  fate  or  regulating  their  lives  according  to  their  own 
interests. 

Summary 

These  politicians  claim,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Ukrainian  people  imply  without  any  doubt  their 
union  with  Russia;  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  afraid  to 
give  to  the  people  of  Ukraine  the  chance  of  presenting  their 
interests  in  an  entirely  free  way.  They  are  afraid  that 
these  people  will  have  a  Constituent  Assembly,  where  they 
can  discuss  directly  and  clearly  this  problem  whether  it 
is  to  their  interests  to  unite  with  Russia  or  to  create  an 
independent  state. 

If  these  protectors  of  the  Ukrainian  people  are  firmly 
convinced  that  the  interests  of  the  Ukraine  demand  that 
this  nation  remain  a  part  of  Russia  "one  and  indivisible," 
why  will  they  not  listen  to  the  free  voice  of  the  Ukrainian 
people  in  their  Constituent  Assembly? 

Then  let  the  people  of  the  Ukraine  express  their  own 
wishes  and  decide  their  own  fate.  They  will  say  where 
their  real  interests  are  and  in  what  manner  they  intend 
to  construct  their  political  and  economic  life.  And  they 
are  infinitely  better  qualified  to  say  it  than  those  who,  pre- 
tending to  uphold  the  Ukrainian  interests,  are  really  work- 
ing for  their  own. 


OiTS 


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